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TURNER'S ACCEPTANCE OF LIMITED VOIR DIRE RENDERS
BATSON'S EQUAL PROTECTION A HOLLOW
PROMISE
BARAT S. MCCLAIN*
More than twenty years after major civil rights activism, racism
continues to pervade American society. Elections are campaigned for-
and won-along racial lines.' There is a pronounced return to overt ra-
cism on college campuses 2 and among working class youths-witness the
Howard Beach incident 3 and the Skinhead phenomena. 4 Troublingly,
* I wish to thank my faculty advisor, Professor David Rudstein, for his many thoughtful
comments and suggestions.
1. In major cities with large black populations, for example, mayoral election campaigns and
results often tend to reflect the racial divisiveness, distrust and resentment of the constituency. May-
oral election campaigns over the last few years in Chicago and Philadelphia are examples of the
acrimony frequently attendant on campaigns involving both black and white candidates. See, e.g.,
Harrison, Daley Easily Wins Race for Chicago Mayor, L.A. Times, Apr. 5, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4;
Belsie, In Chicago Mayoral Primary, The Biggest Issue Is Race, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 19,
1987, at 3; Malcolm, Chicago Mayoral Race: A Matter of Blacks and Whites, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,
1983, A 13, col. 1; Goode, Rizzo Trade Racism Charges, Complaints, U.P.I., Nov. 1, 1987, AM cycle
(NEXIS, Current library, Papers file).
Even national elections can contain more than a small amount of race-based tension. In the
1988 Presidential campaign, George Bush was criticized for running anti-Dukakis commercials fea-
turing Willie Horton, a black convict who raped a white woman while on furlough from a Massa-
chusetts prison. Critics maintained that Bush's strategy in running the commercials was essentially
racist-that he hoped to capitalize on whites' fear of blacks. See, e.g., Cohen, The Republicans Asked
for It, Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1989, A 17; A.P., Oct. 24, 1988, PM cycle (NEXIS, Current library,
Papers file). Additionally, in early 1989, after David Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan leader, was
elected as a Republican member of the Louisiana legislature, the Republican Party was criticized for
having fostered in recent years a favorable climate in the South for racist sentiments. See, e.g.. Co-
hen, supra.
2. A number of newspaper and magazine articles in the last two years have discussed a resur-
gence of racism on college campuses throughout the country. This racism has been manifested in a
variety of ways, including the establishment of reactionary white student organizations, arson on a
black fraternity house, and distribution of student-written literature advancing racist themes. See.
e.g., Tifft, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, TIME, Jan. 23, 1989. at 56.
3. A great deal of publicity recently surrounded the arrest, trial and conviction of several New
York youths for the death of a black youth who was hit by a car as he attempted to escape the white
youths. Jury selection became a racially charged issue when counsel for the youths allegedly tried to
exclude blacks from the jury. See, e.g., Two Juries Are Chosen in Howard Beach Trial. N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1988, B 2, col. 6; 12 From Queens Picked for Jury in Black's Death. id., Oct. 2. 1987. B 2, col.
1; Race and the Law, Blacks Growing More Skeptical of Courts in Racial Bias Cases, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Sept. 28, 1987, at 3; Fried, Picking Howard Beach Jury: Siftiig Outlooks. N.Y. Times. Sept.
10, 1987, § 13, at 4, col. 4.
4. A fair amount of media attention has been given to the recent emergence of so-called neo-
Nazi or white supremacist organizations, such as the Skinheads. Such groups, often composed of
disaffected working class youths, perpetrate intimidation and violence along racial lines. See. e.g..
Applebome, New Report Warns ofAlliance of Racist Groups, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6. 1989. A 11. col. I;
King, Violent Racism Attracts New Breed: Skinheads, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1989. § 1. pt. 2. at 35, col.
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the criminal justice system reflects the pervasiveness of late twentieth
century American racism. Although the judicial system is where racism
is least acceptable, systemic considerations have allowed racial discrimi-
nation to linger-indeed, in some instances, to proliferate.
5
One facet of the criminal justice system, jury selection, has been an
object of the Supreme Court's examination for more than a century.
This concern is highly appropriate, inasmuch as citizen participation on
juries is a significant symbol of our democratic tradition.6 Unfortu-
nately, however, the Court has moved haltingly-sometimes stepping
backwards by narrowly interpreting precedent-in its articulation of
constitutional and prudential standards for juror selection in criminal
trials.
An examination of two Supreme Court opinions recently announced
on the same day illustrates the Court's ambivalence with respect to fulfil-
ling a criminal defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment guarantees
during his trial. In Batson v. Kentucky,7 the Supreme Court, reversing its
previous position, held that a black defendant can make a prima facie
showing of a prosecutor's racially discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges based solely on the facts of his own case.8 However, in Turner
v. Murray,9 the Court upheld the conviction of a black capital defendant
who had been denied specific voir dire inquiry into prospective jurors'
racial prejudice.' 0 Although Turner's death sentence was vacated, five
justices upheld the conviction, reasoning that the trial court's voir dire
did not-except for the fact that it was a capital trial in which jurors had
discretion in sentencing--deny the defendant his constitutional rights."I
This Note will examine some of the major Supreme Court decisions
on the ramifications of racial discrimination on jury selection, focusing
on peremptory challenges and voir dire. First, the Note will discuss the
Court's major equal protection decisions on petit jury selection, particu-
larly its recent decision in Batson on the equal protection considerations
1. See also Leo, A Chilling Wave of Racism; From L.A. to Boston, the Skilheads Are on the March,
TIME, Jan. 25, 1988, at 57.
5. For a wide ranging discussion of the disturbing degree of disparate treatment being afforded
blacks by the criminal justice system today, see Developments - Race and the Criminal Process, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988) [hereinafter Developments].
6. For a discussion of the jury as a linchpin in our democratic system, see J. VAN DYKE, A
Jury of One's Peers, in JURY SEILECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT To REPRE-
SENTATIVE PANELS 1 (1977).
7. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. Id. at 96.
9. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
10. Id. at 37.
11. Id. at 37-38.
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in a prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. Next, the Note will
trace the Court's major decisions on voir dire inquiry into the possible
racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective jurors. The Note will then juxta-
pose the peremptory challenge and voir dire cases.
The juxtaposition of Batson and Turner illustrates that, despite its
repeated affirmation of equal protection and impartial jury doctrines, the
Court seems unwilling to enforce broadly the constitutional rights of mi-
nority defendants in criminal trials. While Batson may stand for en-
hanced equal protection safeguards for a minority defendant, Turner
demonstrates the Court's reluctance-in all but the most extreme cases-
to mandate voir dire on the specific issue of racial or ethnic prejudice.
Further, this juxtaposition of peremptory challenge and voir dire deci-
sions makes clear that under the guise of preserving the discretion of trial
judges in the supervision of voir dire and the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges, the Court has failed fully to enforce constitutional guarantees.
This discussion will be followed by a brief consideration of recent,
abortive legislative attempts to reform the rule governing voir dire in the
federal courts. This discussion provides insight into some of the compet-
ing values weighed by the Court in jury selection cases and may partially
explain, but ultimately does not justify, the Court's equivocation on the
scope of constitutional protections to be provided to minority criminal
defendants. This Note concludes with a recommendation that the
Supreme Court reconcile its inconsistent messages on the constitutional
guarantees to be afforded minority criminal defendants in the selection of
jurors for their trials. The critically important role voir dire plays in the
exercise of peremptory challenges-both by the defendant and the prose-
cution-calls for an explicit statement by the Court that voir dire is not
to be limited by the vagaries of trial court discretion. Rather, voir dire
must be thoroughly exercised in both federal and state court, particularly
in trials involving violent, interracial crime.
I. THE COURT'S DELINEATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION IN JURY
SELECTION-FROM STRA UDER TO BA TSON
A. Strauder and its Progeny
The seminal case interpreting the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection ramifications on jury selection was decided in 1880. In
Strauder v. West Virginia,1 2 a black man was convicted of murder by an
all white jury. He appealed his conviction on the ground that West Vir-
12. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
19891 275
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ginia's statutory exclusion of blacks from jury service violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. ' 3 The Court reversed his
conviction, construing the fourteenth amendment to "contain a neces-
sary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the
colored race ...[which provides an] exemption from legal discrimina-
tions [that] imply[ ] inferiority in civil society, [and] lessen[ ] the security
of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy."' 4 The Court rea-
soned that protection of life and liberty against racial prejudice was a
legal right under the fourteenth amendment and that the right to a trial
by a jury whose decision was not tainted by racial prejudice was a neces-
sary incident of that right.'
5
Strauder made clear that facially discriminatory jury selection stat-
utes violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
However, subsequent discriminatory application of racially neutral jury
selection statutes necessitated further Court attention to the contours of
equal protection. One year after Strauder, in Neal v. Delaware,16 the
Court held that Delaware's exclusion of blacks from both the grand and
petit juries violated the fourteenth amendment by placing an unconstitu-
tional taint on the "fairness and integrity of the whole proceeding against
the prisoner."' 7 William Neal, a black accused of rape, was indicted by a
white grand jury and convicted by a white petit jury. Although blacks in
Delaware voted and could testify at trials, no black had ever been placed
on a list from which grand and petit juries were selected. 18 This occurred
because the state courts construed a juror qualification statute requiring
that members of the jury pool be "sober and judicious" as necessarily
excluding blacks. '9 The Court characterized Delaware's exclusion of
blacks based on supposed deficient intelligence, experience or moral in-
tegrity as "a violent presumption. ' 20 Accordingly, the Court reversed
the lower court's denial of Neal's motion to quash the indictment and
panels of jurors.
21
Despite Strauder and Neal, racial discrimination in the formulation
of jury lists persisted. In 1935, in Norris v. Alabama,22 the Court again
considered the exclusion of blacks from jury service based on the jury
13. Id. at 304-06.
14. Id. at 307-08.
15. Id. at 309.
16. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
17. Id. at 396.
18. Id. at 381.
19. Id. at 388.
20. Id. at 397.
21. Id. at 398.
22. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
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commissioners' belief that no blacks met Alabama's statutory require-
ment of honesty, intelligence and sound judgment.2 3 The Court said that
the black defendant, Clarence Norris, who stood convicted of rape, had
made a prima facie showing of longstanding exclusion of qualified blacks
from jury service. 24 The defendant had produced uncontradicted testi-
mony that no black had-at least for a generation and possibly ever-
served on either a grand jury or a petit jury in the county in which he had
been tried and convicted. 25 The Court reversed Norris's conviction, find-
ing that the county's jury board did not adequately rebut the plaintiff's
prima facie showing. 26 The Court observed that to accept "the mere gen-
eral assertions" of the jury commissioners in the face of the defendant's
evidence of uniform exclusion of blacks would render the fourteenth
amendment "a vain and illusory requirement.
27
B. Swain v. Alabama: The Court's Initial Consideration of Peremptory
Challenges as a Tool of Discrimination
Not only were blacks frequently excluded from jury lists, they were
often excluded from the petit jury by prosecutors' peremptory chal-
lenges. 28 The peremptory challenge, which is provided for in all fifty
states and in the federal system, is a method of removing veniremembers
from the jury panel.29 It allows an attorney to exclude, without explana-
23. Id. at 598-99.
24. Id. at 591.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 599. A member of the jury board testified that a list of all male citizens, from which
blacks were not excluded, was compiled, and that from this list, those meeting statutory qualifica-
tions were placed on the jury roll. Other members of the jury board concurred by affidavit. Id.
27. Id. at 598.
28. J. VAN DYKE, The Third Stage.- Challenges, in JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UN-
CERTAIN COMMITMENT To REPRESENTATIVE PANELS, supra note 6, at 150.
29. See Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenges, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357,
1359-60 (1985). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b), which provides:
If the offense charged is punishable by death, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory chal-
lenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the
government is entitled to six peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants
jointly to 10 peremptory challenges. If the offense charged is punishable by imprisonment
for not more than one year or by fine or both, each side is entitled to 3 peremptory chal-
lenges. If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional
peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
lIL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4(e) (1977) provides:
A defendant tried alone shall be allowed 20 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 10 in a
case in which the punishment may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 5 in all other
cases; except that, in a single trial of more than one defendant, each defendant shall be
allowed 12 peremptory challenges in a capital case, 6 in a case in which the punishment
may be imprisonment in the penitentiary, and 3 in all other cases. If several charges against
a defendant or defendants are consolidated for trial, each defendant shall be allowed per-
emptory challenges upon one charge only, which single charge shall be the charge against
that defendant authorizing the greatest maximum penalty. The State shall be allowed the
same number of peremptory challenges as all of the defendants.
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tion or "cause," a prospective juror whom the attorney, for reasons that
may not be legally supportable, suspects may be biased. 30 The peremp-
tory challenge is of early common law origin and was provided for by
Congress as early as 1790. 3 t Although it fell into disuse in England, the
peremptory challenge in America became a means of excluding blacks
from petit juries during the latter half of the nineteenth century, and
continued well into the first half of the twentieth century. 32 Thus, de-
spite Strauder, Neal and Norris, the peremptory challenge provided an all
too effective means of effecting racial discrimination in jury selection
through the mid-twentieth century.
33
This pattern of racial exclusion in jury selection came before the
Court in the 1965 case of Swain v. Alabama.34 Robert Swain was a black
who had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death by an all white
jury. He appealed his conviction, arguing that blacks were under-
represented on grand juries (only two blacks had served on the grand
jury that indicted him) and systematically excluded from petit juries by
means of peremptory challenges (six blacks had been struck peremptorily
in Swain), resulting in a denial of equal protection. 35 While asserting
that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to a proportionate
number of members of his race on the jury roll, venire or jury, the Swain
Court held that Alabama's systematic exclusion of blacks in the jury se-
lection process could raise a prima facie case of discrimination. 36 The
Court concluded, however, that Robert Swain had not made this show-
ing with his averments of statistical underrepresentation of blacks on
grand and petit juries in his county.3 7
The Swain Court distinguished Norris, where blacks had been totally
30. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderfil Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 550-51
(1975).
31. The first Congress established that the defendant was entitled to 35 peremptory challenges
in trials for treason and 20 in trials for other felonies specified in the 1790 Act as punishable by
death. I Stat. 119 (1790). In regard to trials for other offenses outside the 1790 statute, both the
defendant and the Government were thought to have a right of peremptory challenge, although the
source of this right was not wholly clear. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214 (1965).
32. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 28. See also Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir
Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 166-67 ("In
the United States, as broadened standards of eligibility for jury service manifested democratic faith
in the popular administration of justice, the peremptory challenge manifested countervailing doubt.
mistrust, and ambivalence.").
33. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 28.
34. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
35. Although the grand jury which had indicted Swain had two blacks on it. no black had
served on a petit jury in Swain's county since about 1950, even though petit jury venires typically
consisted of six or seven blacks. Id. at 205.
36. Id. at 208, 224.
37. Id. at 206, 209, 224.
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excluded from grand and petit jury venire panels.3 8 While acknowledg-
ing that Alabama's system of jury list compilation was "haphazard" and
"imperfect," resulting in underrepresentation of blacks, the Swain Court
did not find purposeful racial discrimination. 39 More significantly, after
a rather lengthy recounting of the history of peremptory challenges in
England and America,40 the Court concluded that the importance of the
challenge in a pluralistic society precluded examination of a prosecutor's
reasons for exercising such challenges. 4' The Court reasoned that, being
predicated on an extensive and probing voir dire, the "function of the
challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but
to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not other-
wise."'4 2 Further, the Court averred that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges by both the prosecution and the defense ensured that the scales of
justice were evenly balanced.
4 3
Although willing to presume prosecutorial integrity in a particular
case, the Swain Court observed that fourteenth amendment concerns
have added significance when a prosecutor "in case after case ... is re-
sponsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified
jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for
cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries."
44
Although the Court found that Robert Swain had not demonstrated a
constitutional violation, it held that a defendant could successfully raise
an equal protection objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges
by showing-in a more specific and conclusive fashion-a systematic ex-
clusion of blacks over a period of time.
4 5
Justice Goldberg dissented on the ground that under the equal pro-
tection principle announced in Strauder, Neal and Norris, Robert Swain
had in fact shown that the prosecutor had used his peremptory chal-
lenges unconstitutionally. 46 Moreover, he argued that, in the context of
the era's heightened sensitivity to the persistence of racial discrimina-
38. Id. at 206.
39. Id. at 209.
40. Id. at 212-18.
41. Id. at 222.
42. Id. at 219.
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 223.
45. Id. at 227.




tion,47 it was "unthinkable" that the Court would countenance any
"weaken[ing] or undermin[ing] [of the prohibition of state discrimination
on the basis of race] at this late date."'4 8 Justice Goldberg noted the irony
in the majority's approving reference to Strauder and its progeny despite
a holding that he deemed incompatible with Strauder's equal protection
principles. 4 9 He viewed Swain as having presented a prima facie showing
of systematic racial exclusion at least as strong as that made in Norris.
50
Justice Goldberg also took issue with the majority's distinction between
exclusion of blacks from the venire, which had been at issue in Norris,
and their exclusion from the jury itself, which was at issue in Swain.
5 1
The majority argued that this distinction was significant because while
venire selection was carried out entirely by state officers (i.e., jury com-
missioners), peremptory challenges were exercised by defense counsel as
well as the prosecutor. 52 Justice Goldberg responded that the common
object of inquiry in all the discriminatory jury selection cases was effec-
tive exclusion from jury service, and concluded that the Swain holding
seriously impaired the authority of Strauder and its progeny.
5 3
C. Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's (Mostly Rhetorical) Equal
Protection Remedy for Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges
Twenty-one years later, in the wake of much scholarly criticism of
the decision, 54 as well as lower court circumvention of its rule, 5 5 the
Court in Batson v. Kentucky effectively overruled Swain. James Batson,
a black, had been convicted of burglary and receipt of stolen goods by an
all white jury. He appealed the conviction on the ground that the prose-
cutor had peremptorily challenged all four blacks on the venire, thereby
denying him his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury and a jury
47. Justice Goldberg referred to the Court's effective overturning of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. 380 U.S. at 231.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 232.
51. Id. at 239.
52. Id. at 227.
53. Id. at 239-41.
54. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note 28, at 166-67: Johnson, Black Innocence and the White
Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV, 1611, 1659 & n.242 (1985); Brown, McGuire & Winters. The Peremptory
Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 192, 196-202 (1978).
55. Several years after the Swain decision, the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) extended the sixth amendment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Additionally, some state courts relied upon their state constitutions in prohibiting dis-
criminatory challenges. The two leading cases are Commonwealth v. Soares. 377 Mass. 461. 387
N.E.2d 499, cert. dentied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748.
148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
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representing a fair cross section of the community.5
6
The Supreme Court did not reach these arguments, deciding the
case instead on fourteenth amendment equal protection grounds. The
Court held that a black criminal defendant can make a prima facie show-
ing of a prosecutor's purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges solely on evidence concerning his particular
trial. 57 The Court stated that a defendant could make this prima facie
showing by demonstrating that: (1) the defendant belongs to a cogniza-
ble racial group; (2) the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to
exclude veniremembers of that group from the jury; and (3) the relevant
circumstances give rise to the inference of purposeful discrimination.
For example, a black defendant could make this prima facie showing
where a prosecutor removes all the black veniremembers without ques-
tioning them during voir dire, thereby demonstrating that the prosecutor
lacked a legitimate reason for the exercise of those peremptory
challenges. 58
The Court said that after the defendant has made this prima facie
showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to rebut the defendant's
challenge of racial discrimination. 59 This rebuttal must be predicated on
racially neutral grounds; the prosecutor cannot rebut by stating that he
challenged jurors on the assumption that they would be partial to the
defendant because of race or by merely affirming his own good faith in
56. Batson, 476 U.S. at 113 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Batson's petition for certiorari).
57. Id. at 96.
58. Id. Because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, the Court had over the years
developed a standard by which an alleged victim of discrimination could make a prima facie showing
of purposeful discrimination. This prima facie showing injury selection cases was first articulated by
the Court in regard to grand jury selection. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977)
(based on relevant facts, including statistical disparity between county's population of Mexican-
Americans (79%) and those called for grand jury service (39%), plaintiff made prima facie case of
intentional discrimination); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (black made prima facie
showing of discriminatory grand jury selection where 21% of the population eligible for grand jury
service was black but only 5% of the defendant's venire, and none of defendant's grand jurors, was
black); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (blacks made prima facie showing of discrimination
in selection of grand and petit jury, where measurable black population was 27. 1%, but blacks com-
prised 9.1% of grand jury venire and 7.8% of petit jury venire).
This prima facie showing standard was also an outgrowth of the Court's recognition in other
racial discrimination cases that discrimination frequently could be shown by the totality of relevant
circumstances. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (dis-
criminatory intent can be proven by a combination of many kinds of evidence because many factors
can enter into an allegedly discriminatory decision; however, when discriminatory purpose is shown
to be a motivating factor in a decision, judicial scrutiny is appropriate); Washington v. Davis. 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (black candidates' exclusion more often than whites from police training program
because of lower scores on verbal tests insufficient to show equal protection violation; purposeful
discrimination must be shown by a totality of relevant facts).




In applying this particular analysis, the Batson Court weighed the
competing interests of prosecutorial discretion and the defendant's con-
stitutional rights. The prosecutor historically has had the latitude to ex-
clude those prospective jurors suspected of latent, or at least
unarticulated, bias.61 But in Batson, unlike Swain, the Court was more
willing to displace prosecutorial discretion because of constitutional de-
mands. 62 Thus, Batson seemingly represents a significant shift in the bal-
ance between the criminal justice system's procedural devices and
institutional demands, on one hand, and the constitutional rights of a
minority defendant, on the other. Batson therefore, at least ostensibly,
represents a return to the clearly articulated equal protection precepts of
Strauder, Neal and Norris.
In his concurring opinion in Batson, Justice Marshall expressed seri-
ous reservations about a trial court's ability to assess accurately a prose-
cutor's motives. He feared that unconscious as well as conscious racism
on the part of the prosecutor or the judge might render illusory Batson's
equal protection objectives. 63 Justice Marshall advocated the total aboli-
tion of the peremptory challenge as the appropriate response to systemic
racism. 6
4
60. Id. at 97-98.
61. See supra note 31. The prosecutor has not always had the right to peremptorily challenge,
however. In 1305, Parliament, deciding that the Crown's claim of an unlimited number of peremp-
tory challenges led to a jury biased for the prosecution, passed a statute eliminating the Crown's
right to peremptorily challenge. Statute of 33 Edw., Stat. 4 (1305). However, the Crown retained the
right to ask disfavored prospective jurors to "stand aside." If, as is usually the case, a jury can be
selected without recalling those prospective jurors, they are permanently dismissed. Effectively, then,
in most cases, asking a prospective juror to "stand aside" is a peremptory challenge.
In the early years of this Nation, some states continued the British practice of "standing aside,"
and some allowed the prosecution to challenge peremptorily, but most severely restricted the
number of peremptory challenges the prosecution was allowed. The statute passed in 1790 by Con-
gress made no mention of the government's right to challenge peremptorily. Gradually, though, as
distrust of government waned, the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges became common.
By 1856, when the Supreme Court held that federal courts should adopt the procedure of the state
in which they sat, United States v. Shackleford, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856), most states had begun
to authorize the prosecution's use of peremptories. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the
prosecution's right to challenge peremptorily was firmly established. J. VAN DYKE, supra note 28, at
147-50.
62. See Developments, supra note 5, at 1576. This article provides a thoughtful discussion of the
Court's reluctance to apply broadly the antidiscrimination principle embodied by the equal protec-
tion clause because of concerns about the autonomy and integrity of criminal justice institutions.
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Justice Marshall maintained that, based on the experience of state courts in jurisdictions
that had already adopted a similar evidentiary standard for the evaluation of peremptory challenges.
only the most flagrantly discriminatory challenges would satisfy the prima facie showing require-
ment. Id. at 105. Additionally, he asserted that it was all too easy for a prosecutor to manufacture a
facially neutral reason for a discriminatory challenge and all too difficult for a judge to discern the
prosecutor's true intent. Id. Although Justice Marshall's concerns are understandable, the narrow
[Vol. 65:273
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In his Batson dissent, Chief Justice Burger also expressed considera-
ble skepticism regarding the trial court's ability to fulfill Batson's equal
protection mandate. He warily commented, "While our trial judges are
'experienced in supervising voir dire,' they have no experience in ad-
ministering rules like this."' 65 In a criticism of the majority's application
of traditional equal protection analysis to voir dire, Chief Justice Burger
identified Batson's fundamental inconsistency with Turner.66 The voir
dire questioning of prospective jurors is often directed at uncovering gen-
eralized, stereotypical racial notions that would be condemned on equal
protection grounds in other contexts. 67 Consequently, the link that nec-
essarily exists between voir dire and the intelligent exercise of peremp-
tory challenges means that in order to safeguard the sixth amendment
right to an unpartial jury, inquiries into biases which are anathema to
equal protection principles should sometimes be made.68
Herein lies Batson's fundamental flaw. A tragic legacy of our na-
application of challenges for cause in most courts creates a situation where peremptory challenges
are necessary when counsel's suspicion of prospective juror bias is strong and probably well founded
but legally insufficient for a challenge for cause. See infra note 68.
Moreover, one commentator has identified several additional problems with Justice Marshall's
proposal. One is the prospect of hung juries in the many jurisdictions that require unanimous ver-
dicts. Another is the inconsistency between criminal cases-to which Batson was addressed-and
civil cases where the government still is able to exercise peremptory challenges. Also, Batson creates
an "adversary imbalance" between the prosecution and the defendant, because it applies equal pro-
tection scrutiny only to the government's challenges. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease
but Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 97, 144-47. Nevertheless, many commentators have
joined Justice Marshall's call for the abolition of peremptory challenges. E.g., Developments, supra
note 5, at 1588; Note, The Continued Use of Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges After Batson v.
Kentucky: Is the Only Alternative to Eliminate the Peremptory Challenge Itself? 23 N. ENG. L. REV.
221 (1988); Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and
Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELl L. REV. 1026,
1039-46 (1987). See also J. VAN DYKE, supra note 28, at 167-68.
65. 476 U.S. at 128 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Rehnquist joined Chief
Justice Burger in the dissent.
66. Chief Justice Burger suggested the example of an Asian defendant, on trial for the capital
murder of a white victim, asking predominantly white prospective jurors whether they harbor racial
prejudice against Asians. Id. As is pointed out later in this note, Turner v. Murray requires this
question to be asked of prospective jurors, at least in capital trials where the defendant is accused of
an interracial crime yet it is arguably contrary to equal protection doctrine because it implies that
biases and other distinctions inhere to different racial groups. For a further development of the
inconsistency between Batson and Turner, see infra notes 166-95 and accompanying text.
67. Batson, 476 U.S. at 128 & n.9.
68. Id. As a number of commentators have noted, much of the need for peremptory challenges
stems from the narrow statutory grounds for challenges for cause as well as the trial court's frequent
reluctance to grant challenges for cause. Consequently, unless a prospective juror clearly admits to
bias that could affect his decisionmaking, an attorney cannot remove the veniremember "for cause."
Arguably, then, peremptory challenges are the chief means of obtaining an impartial jury, as guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment. See Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash Between
Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 355 (1982) Suggs & Sales. Juror Self-
Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 246 (1981). See also Babcock.




tion's history of discrimination against blacks and other minorities is
stereotypical beliefs: that the group members are, for example, lazy, in-
tellectually and morally inferior, and prone to crime. To ensure the
jury's ability to decide a case-especially an emotionally-charged interra-
cial case-solely on the evidence, counsel on both sides exercise chal-
lenges. When the reason for excluding the prospective juror is legally
sufficient (for example, the prospective juror knows one of the parties or
a member of their family and therefore cannot be relied on to decide the
case without bias), counsel challenges for cause. 69 But frequently, coun-
sel's suspicion of prospective juror bias is neither confirmed nor removed
by the voir dire examination, particularly when the voir dire has been
brief, consisting of close-ended questions, such as "Can you be impar-
tial?" It is in those less certain, though troubling, instances of concern
regarding possible juror bias that peremptory challenges can play a vital
role in furthering the ends of justice.
70
Batson does not establish procedural guidelines for the trial court's
evaluation of the prosecutor's allegedly discriminatory challenges. 71 The
Court chose instead to defer to the discretion of trial judges concerning
both what procedures should be followed upon a defendant's timely ob-
jection to a prosecutor's challenge and whether the prosecutor's chal-
lenges create a prima facie case of discrimination. 72 Batson has been
widely criticized for this lack of specific standard-setting. 73 One major
concern is that wide judicial discretion may not adequately advance Bat-
son's equal protection objectives because trial judges may all too easily
accept prosecutors' pretextual explanations for discriminatory chal-
lenges. 74 Because appellate courts review Batson decisions on a deferen-
69. See supra note 68. E.g., Ex parte Tucker, 454 So. 2d 552 (Ala. 1984) (the brother of the
main prosecution witness); State v. Payne, 167 W. Va. 252, 280 S.E.2d 72 (1981) (a close friend of
the prosecutor); State v. Forman, 466 So. 2d 747 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (a friend of the defendant).
70. See supra note 68.
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
72. The Court justified this deference to the trial court on the basis of the trial judge's unique
ability to evaluate the credibility of the defendant's prima facie showing and the prosecutor's rebut-
tal, id. at 98 & n.21, as well as on the diverse jury selection practices followed in state and federal
trial courts. Id. at 99 & n.24.
73. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 32, at 171 (although finding the Batson rule cumbersome
procedurally, acknowledging that "[iun essence, the Court's requirement of a prima facie case left
lower court judges at large to determine when 'things look bad.' "); Note, Batson v. Kentucky and
the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection 74 VA. L. REV.
811, 817 (1988). See generally Pizzi, supra note 64.
74. See Alschuler, supra note 32, at 74 & nn.90-94 (recent case examples of various, quite
possibly pretextual explanations for challenges); Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges and
the Democratic Jury. The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 60
("the tests outlined by the reviewing courts, and presumably applied by trial judges, pose virtually no
obstacle to anything but blatant discrimination and may actually serve as a jury selection discrimina-
tion 'how to' guide"); see also Note, supra note 73, at 820.
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tial standard, a trial judge's acceptance of a pretextual rebuttal may not
be subjected to equal protection scrutiny by a reviewing court.
75
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S EQUIVOCATION ON THE
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROTECTIONS To BE AFFORDED
THROUGH VOIR DIRE
The most problematic post-Batson issue arises from the Supreme
Court's failure to reinforce its affirmation of the equal protection limits
on peremptory challenges with a corresponding degree of support for a
probing voir dire. With voir dire, even more than with peremptory chal-
lenges, the Court has chosen to defer broadly to the discretion of the trial
court.
7 6
Like peremptory challenges, voir dire is governed by rule or statute
in the federal courts and all fifty states. 77 Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 78 is typical of the discretion vested in trial judges
in many jurisdictions. Although it allows the judge to permit counsel for
both parties to examine the prospective jurors, most federal judges and a
great many state judges choose to conduct the questioning themselves.
79
75. The Court in Batson tacitly suggested that appellate review should be deferential when it
stated its confidence that trial judges, experienced as they are in supervising voir dire, would be able
to decide if circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges create a prima
facie case of discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. Even more significantly, the Batson Court said
that "[s]ince the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on
evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." Id.
at 98 n.21. Accordingly, appellate courts have applied a deferential or "clearly erroneous" standard.
E.g., United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415
(9th Cir. 1988). Consequently, a trial judge's acceptance of a possibly pretextual explanation for
peremptory challenges is likely to be accepted by an appellate court which does not have
veniremember demeanor or other possibly relevant information on which to base its decision. See
also infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 5, at 1577 (noting that a trial judge's discretion in the
conduct of voir dire is the feature of jury selection that the Court has most valued and sought to
preserve); id. at 1580 (observing that as a result, the Court has limited the reach of equal protection
and due process principles in the voir dire context). See also Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-
Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images. and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REV. 501, 527 (1986)
(noting that despite the value of the peremptory challenge being closely linked to the scope of voir
dire, and the Supreme Court's praise for the use of peremptory challenges, it has provided only weak
protection for voir dire).
77. See Babcock, supra note 30, at 548 n.15. E.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(a); MICH. R. CRIM.
P. 2.511 (c).
78. FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(a) provides:
[T]he court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or the defendant's
attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such fur-
ther inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
79. A 1977 study indicated that approximately three quarters of federal district judges conduct
voir dire without oral participation of counsel. G. BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMI-
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There are two primary reasons for this: first, widespread judicial belief
that it is easier to choose an impartial jury with little or no attorney
involvement;80 and second, systemic concerns regarding the additional
time and cost involved in lengthy attorney-conducted voir dire.
8'
The Court in Batson gave only passing (and dismissive) recognition
to the likelihood that administrative concerns might operate at cross pur-
poses with the equal protection mandate Batson articulated. 82 Yet in
some quarters, there is an acute awareness, despite the systemic burdens
attendant on a more liberal exercise of voir dire, that the full implemen-
tation of Batson may sometimes require a thoroughly probing examina-
tion of prospective jurors.
83
A. The Pre-Turner Development of the Voir Dire Cases
Beginning in 1931, in Aldridge v. United States,84 the Supreme Court
asserted the importance of a thorough examination of prospective jurors,
particularly when there is an increased risk of bias because of the interra-
cial nature of the crime. Alfred Aldridge, a black, was convicted of the
murder of a white policeman. The trial judge who conducted voir dire
was reluctant to infuse the issue of racial prejudice into the proceedings,
and refused Aldridge's request that the prospective jurors be questioned
on any possible bias they might feel given the interracial nature of the
NATION: PRACTICES AND OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 6, 12 (1977). This represented
a significant increase from 1970, when 56% of the federal district judges so conducted voir dire.
Suggs & Sales, supra note 68, at 251. As of 1975, at least twenty state court systems conducted voir
dire without the oral participation of counsel. Babcock, supra note 30, at 548 n.15. By 1987, attor-
neys were permitted to conduct voir dire in only approximately forty-four percent of the nation's
state courts. Voir Dire: Hearing on S. 953 and S. 954 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Adminis-
trative Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Judah Best, Chairman-Elect of the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association).
80. See G. BERMANT, supra note 79, at 23.
The most common concern regarding potential abuses of voir dire by attorneys was articulated
by the president of the Association of Trial Lawyers who stated that
[t]rial attorneys are acutely attuned to the nuances of human behavior, which enables them
to detect the minutest traces of bias or inability to reach an appropriate decision. Their
main interest, obviously, is to obtain a jury favorable to their clients. They are completely
dedicated to their clients because that is their job.
(emphasis in original).
A team of researchers including a trial judge, who argued in favor of eliminating oral participa-
tion by lawyers in the voir dire examination identified the following factors as common voir dire
abuses by lawyers: lengthy, detailed questioning with no specific goal in mind; establishing rapport
with the jury; "pre-instructing" veniremen on the facts of the case or the applicable law; and pre-
committing a juror to a particular opinion. Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An
Empirical Study, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 916, 942-44 (1971).
81. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
82. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
83. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
84. 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
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crime.85 Aldridge appealed his conviction on the ground that the judge's
refusal to inquire into racial prejudice had denied him a fair and impar-
tial jury.8 6 The Supreme Court reversed Aldridge's conviction, holding
that the defendant had been entitled to the inquiry of the prospective
jurors. 87
The Court rejected the government's argument that voir dire in-
quiry into racial prejudice would be detrimental to the administration of
justice. Chief Justice Hughes stated that
it would be far more injurious to permit it to be thought that persons
entertaining a disqualifying prejudice were allowed to serve as jurors
and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of disqualification were
barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of justice
into disrepute.
88
Moreover, Chief Justice Hughes referred to the importance of voir dire in
discerning the existence of prospective juror bias in respect to races other
than black, as well as religious prejudice and "other prejudices of a seri-
ous character."8 9
Justice McReynolds, the sole dissenter, espoused the government's
losing argument. He saw the defendant's claim as idle and essentially
baseless. "Unhappily, the enforcement of our criminal laws is scandal-
ously ineffective. Crimes of violence multiply and punishment walks
lamely. Courts ought not to increase the difficulties by magnifying theo-
retical possibilities." 90 Although Justice McReynolds' position was a
lonely one in Aldridge, it presaged well the counterargument to a probing
voir dire that was to emerge in later years.
After Aldridge, the Supreme Court's message seemed clear: a trial
judge's refusal to examine prospective jurors on possible racial prejudice
against a black defendant could well be considered reversible error. Ac-
cordingly, appellate courts reversed convictions in cases where the trial
judge had refused a black defendant's request to have the venire panel
specifically questioned on racial prejudice. In United States v. Robin-
son,91 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
* the conviction of a black man accused of unlawfully dispensing and dis-
tributing a narcotic drug, 92 because the trial judge had refused Robin-
son's request for specific questioning of prospective jurors on racial
85. Id. at 310.
86. Id. at 309.
87. Id. at 314.
88. Id. at 315.
89. Id. at 313.
90. Id. at 318 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
91. 466 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1972).
92. Id. at 782.
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prejudice. 93 Relying on Aldridge, the court held that the trial judge's
refusal had constituted an abuse of discretion that was reversible error.
94
Similarly, in United States v. Gore,9 5 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed a conviction for possession of stolen property because of
the trial judge's refusal to examine the jury on racial prejudice. 96 And in
King v. United States,97 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed a conviction for assault because the trial court re-
fused to question prospective jurors regarding prejudice they might feel
due to the interracial nature of the crime.
9 8
Despite the strength and clarity of Aldridge's holding, it had not
been expressly based on any specific constitutional provision, but rather
on a general notion of fairness. 99 Forty years later, the Court apparently
felt the need to rectify this by anchoring voir dire in the Constitution.
Ham v. South Carolina '00 provided such an opportunity. In Ham, the
Supreme Court considered a trial judge's refusal to inquire of prospective
jurors whether they had possible racial bias that could affect their consid-
eration of the case. °'0 Gene Ham was a bearded, black civil rights
worker who was convicted of possession of marijuana. Ham defended on
the ground that his arrest had been in retaliation for his civil rights activ-
ities.' 0 2 On appeal, he argued that the trial judge's failure to examine the
jurors concerning racial prejudice had denied him his constitutional
rights.' 0 3 The Supreme Court agreed. Citing Chief Justice Hughes' rea-
soning in Aldridge that the "essential demands of fairness" require an
inquiry into any possible racial prejudice, the Court reversed Ham's con-
viction.'14 The Court identified the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause as the basis of the "essential demands of fairness" referred to by
93. Id. at 781.
94. Id. at 782.
95. 435 F.2d 1110 (4th Cir. 1970).
96. The Gore trial judge had refused the defense counsel's request for a voir dire question con-
cerning whether the prospective jurors would be prejudiced by the fact that the defendants were
black. He thought that such a question would improperly inject a racial issue into the case. Id. at
1111.
97. 362 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
98. Defense counsel had requested that the prospective jurors be questioned concerning
whether they would be prejudiced by the fact that the complaining witness was white and the de-
fendants were black. Thejudge refused, stating "I shall never ask that question. We do not draw any
color line in this courtroom." Id. at 969.
99. Specifically, Chief Justice Hughes said that the trial judge's exercise of discretion, and the
restrictions upon inquiries at the request of counsel were subject to "the essential demands of fair-
ness." Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 310.
100. 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
101. Id. at 525.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 529.
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Chief Justice Hughes in Aldridge.105
The Court, however, rejected Ham's additional arguments that the
lack of voir dire questioning concerning his beard and pretrial publicity
surrounding the drug problem had deprived him of his constitutional
rights.'0 6 But in separate concurring opinions, Justices Douglas and
Marshall maintained that the trial judge had abused his discretion in re-
fusing to examine the prospective jurors on the issue of prejudice against
facial hair.10 7 Justice Douglas rhetorically asked, "If the defendant, es-
pecially one being prosecuted for the illegal use of drugs, is not allowed
even to make the most minimal inquiry to expose such prejudices, can it
be expected that he will receive a fair trial?"' 0 8 Justice Marshall main-
tained that "the right to an impartial jury carries with it the concomitant
right to take reasonable steps designed to insure that the jury is impartial.
A variety of techniques is available to serve this end, but perhaps the
most important of these is the jury challenge."'' 0 9 Justice Marshall con-
tinued, "Of course, the right to challenge has little meaning if it is unac-
companied by the right to ask relevant questions on voir dire upon which
the challenge for cause can be predicated."' 10
Despite the Court's statements in Aldridge and Ham, some trial
courts continued to resist probing voir dire. Opponents of a more expan-
sive voir dire trotted out a parade of horribles,"'1 especially time con-
sumption in an already lengthy trial process"12 and the potential for
abuse by zealous advocates, eager to establish rapport with jurors."t 3 But
proponents of probing voir dire countered that a "more efficient" judge-
conducted voir dire "would reduce jury selection in criminal cases to a
wooden process, ritualistic in form, ineffectual in practice, haphazard in
result."' Further, proponents of attorney-conducted voir dire main-
tained that any possible attorney abuses in voir dire questioning were
105. Id. at 526-27.
106. Id. at 527-28.
107. Id. at 529-30 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 530-31 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Id. at 530 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. Id. at 532 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
110. Id.
111. For a fairly representative post-Ham judicial opinion discussing the ills of prolonged, attor-
ney-conducted voir dire, see People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 828, 506 P.2d 193, 202, 106 Cal. Rptr.
369, 375-76 (1973). The court stated:
We conclude that direct examination by counsel has perverted the purpose of voir dire, and
transformed the examination of jurors into a contest between counsel for the selection of a
jury partial to his cause and for the attainment of rapport with the jurors so selected, a
contest which may overshadow the actual trial on the merits.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 834, 506 P.2d at 206. 106 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (Mosk. J., dissenting).
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controllable at all times by the judge. 115
A sharp difference of opinion over the scope of voir dire and the
appropriate degree of discretion that should be vested in the trial judge
emerged on the Supreme Court as well. Shortly after the Court decided
Ham, it denied certiorari in Ross v. Massachusetts,116 a case in which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had twice upheld the convic-
tion of a black man who had been charged with several violent, interra-
cial crimes.' '7 The defendant's appeal had been based on the trial judge's
refusal to ask a specific question concerning racial prejudice during voir
dire.' 18 Justice Marshall dissented from the denial of certiorari. 1 9 He
disagreed with the state court's reasoning that Ross was distinguishable
from Ham because Ross was not likely to be a "special target for racial
prejudice,"' 120 and thus was not entitled to voir dire questioning of pro-
spective jurors on the specific issue of racial prejudice.
12
A little more than two years later, the Court indicated that it was
indeed retreating from the broad statements of Aldridge and Ham. In
Ristaino v. Ross,' 22 the Court rejected the application of Ham to all cases
where juror prejudice might be an issue simply because of the interracial
nature of the crime.' 23 Stating that "Ham did not announce a require-
115. Justice Mosk wrote, "I do not agree that judges are impotent to curb this abuse by methods
short of totally eliminating the right of participatory interrogation by counsel." Id., 506 P.2d at 206,
106 Cal. Rptr. at 382. See also J. Van Dyke, supra note 28, at 165 n.h (a careful judge can guide
attorney questioning so as to prevent abuses).
116. 414 U.S. 1080 (1973).
117. This was the petitioner's second petition for certiorari. The Court granted the first petition
and remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, for reconsideration in light
of Ham v. South Carolina. The Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed Ross's conviction for armed
robbery, assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and assault and battery with intent to
murder. Id.
118. Id. at 1080-81.
119. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in the dissent.
120. Id. at 1082.
121. Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that Hain's rule was derived from Aldridge which, like
Ross, had involved alleged violence by a black against a white police officer. Id. at 1083-85. Justice
Marshall found the state court's narrow interpretation of Ham as requiring a specific inquiry into
racial prejudice only when racial prejudice was inextricably bound up in the facts of the case an utter
distortion of the broad principle set forth in Aldridge. He asserted that the Aldridge Court had not
relied on any particular circumstances other than the possibility of prejudice existing among the
prospective jurors to justify "the compelling nature of an inquiry into racial prejudice-the principal
target of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Observing that racial prejudice is "a cultural malady that
has shaped our history as a nation," id. at 1085, Justice Marshall maintained that where a black is
accused of an attack on a white policeman, "it would be disingenuous at best to assert that he [Ross]
is not apt to be a particular target of racial prejudice." Id. Justice Marshall concluded that the
Court's denial of certiorari was "to see our decision in Ham v. South Carolina stillborn and to write
an epitaph for those 'essential demands of fairness' recognized by this Court 40 years ago in Al-
dridge." Id.
122. 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
123. Id. at 597.
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ment of universal applicability,"'' 24 the Court held that "the demands of
due process could be satisfied by [the trial judge's] more generalized but
thorough inquiry into the impartiality of the veniremen.' 25 The Court
did concede, however, that despite the lack of a constitutional mandate
to inquire into racial prejudice, "the wiser course generally is to pro-
pound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if re-
quested by the defendant."' 126 Further, in a tacit reversal of Ham's
statement that Aldridge had been grounded in the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause, the Court characterized the Aldridge holding
as having been based not on constitutional principles but on the Supreme
Court's supervisory power. 12 7 In his dissent, Justice Marshall stated,
"Today ... the Court emphatically confirms that the promises inherent
in Ham and Aldridge will not be fulfilled."' 128
Many post-Ristaino lower court decisions avoided the Court's limi-
tation of the Aldridge and Ham rule by basing their holdings on the
Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal courts. For example,
two years after Ristaino, in United States v. Bowles, 129 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the conviction of a black man who
had been convicted of distributing an illegal drug. 130 The court held that
the defendant had been denied a fair trial because the trial court refused
to inquire specifically into possible racial prejudice among the prospec-
tive jurors. 13' Relying on Aldridge, the court reasoned that the federal
courts were required, based on the Supreme Court's supervisory power,
even if not on the Constitution, to conduct a searching voir dire.132 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that, despite the fact that Rule 24(a) vested
discretion in trial judges, "it by no means follows that where, as here, the
defendant is a Negro, the district judge may with impunity refuse to
make appropriate inquiry of the jury panel as to possible racial bias, and
then justify such refusal by asserting the exercise of discretion."', 33
Moreover, even in the wake of Ristaino, some state appellate courts
continued to construe the minority defendant's right to a thorough voir
dire against the constitutional backdrop of Aldridge and Ham, despite
the lack of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over state courts. For
124. Id. at 596.
125. Id. at 598.
126. Id. at 597 n.9.
127. Id. at 598 n.10.
128. Id. at 599 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall in the dissent.
129. 574 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1978).
130. Id. at 974.




instance, in State v. Taylor,134 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island va-
cated the conviction of a black man for breaking and entering with intent
to commit larceny because of the trial court's failure to question the ve-
nire on racial prejudice. 135 The court reasoned that Rhode Island's voir
dire rule, which required trial courts to permit counsel to supplement the
trial judge's questioning of jurors with further inquiry, had been vio-
lated.' 36 The court bolstered its holding by pointing to dicta in Ristaino
concerning a state's freedom to allow or require questions not constitu-
tionally demanded.' 37 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Christian,138 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the murder, rape and burglary
conviction of a black because the trial court refused to permit voir dire
questioning on beliefs regarding different sex drives between the races.1
39
In Swan v. State,140 the Supreme Court of Indiana, although affirming
the conviction, asserted the Aldridge rule that a defendant is entitled to
have prospective jurors asked whether they have any racial prejudice that
would prevent a fair and impartial trial.' 4 ' In Commonwealth v.
Futch,142 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the murder con-
viction of a black man because he had been denied certain voir dire ques-
tions. 143  Like the Taylor court, the Futch court noted Ristaino's
statement that states were free to allow or require questions not required
by the Constitution. 144
Several years after Ristaino, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 45 the
Supreme Court further modified its position on voir dire. The Court said
that Aldridge and Ristaino, taken together, implied that the federal trial
courts had a nonconstitutional obligation to inquire specifically into pro-
spective juror racial bias whenever a defendant accused of a violent inter-
134. 423 A.2d 1174 (R.I. 1980).
135. Id. at 1176.
136. Id. at 1175-76.
137. Id. at 1175.
138. 480 Pa. 131, 389 A.2d 545 (1978).
139. The court reasoned that the case was racially sensitive because the victim of the rape was an
elderly white, the defendant was black and this racial difference was emphasized by the prosecution's
trial strategy. Id. at 137, 389 A.2d at 548.
140. 268 Ind. 317, 375 N.E.2d 198 (1978).
141. Id. at 321, 375 N.E.2d at 200. This case had a very interesting twist to its facts. The court
found that the defendant had not been denied fundamental fairness during his trial as a result of his
counsel's trial strategy, which included calling the defendant a "nigger" in front of the prospective
jurors during voir dire. The defendant had apparently agreed to this strategy in an effort to test
prospective juror attitudes toward racial prejudice.
142. 469 Pa. 422, 366 A.2d 246 (1976).
143. In a footnote, the court observed that precedent in the state court upholding voir dire ques-
tioning was sound, notwithstanding Ristaino, because of its basis in state law. Id. at 428 n.4. 366
A.2d at 249 n.4.
144. Id.
145. 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
[Vol. 65:273
LIMITED VOIR DIRE
racial crime so requested. 46 The Court instructed that this rule was
applicable whenever a "reasonable possibility" existed that racial bias
might infect the jury's decisionmaking. 47 The Court noted that violent
interracial crimes frequently created such a "reasonable possibility."'' 48
However, based on the Rosales-Lopez facts, in which an individual of
Mexican descent had been convicted of smuggling aliens, the Court
found that the trial judge had not erred in refusing to question prospec-
tive jurors specifically on bias against Mexicans because the issues in the
trial did not involve a violent, interracial act or allegations of racial or
ethnic bias. 1
4 9
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that Aldridge, as well as the
many state court decisions on which Aldridge had been based, stated a
rule far broader than that articulated by the majority in Rosales-Lopez. 15 0
That early rule, he said, required none of the "special circumstances"
(i.e., a violent crime, with defendant and victim of different races) that
the Court now required.' 5 1 Justice Stevens also observed that the "over-
whelming majority of Federal Circuit Judges who have confronted the
question presented in this case have interpreted Aldridge as establishing a
firm rule entitling a minority defendant to some inquiry of prospective
jurors on voir dire about possible racial or ethnic prejudice unrelated to
the specific facts of the case."'
152
B. Turner v. Murray: A Further (and Formalistic) Limitation
of Voir Dire
Five years after the Rosales-Lopez decision, and, ironically, on the
same day it decided Batson, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Turner v. Murray. 53 After reiterating the limitations imposed in Ris-
taino, the Turner Court drew the line on constitutionally mandated voir
dire at the capital trials of minority defendants. Willie Lloyd Turner was
a black man who had been convicted and sentenced to death in state
court for fatally shooting a white during a robbery. Seven justices (six
justices joined by Chief Justice Burger concurring in the judgment)
agreed in the disposition of the death penalty. The Court vacated the
death sentence, reasoning that the trial court had committed reversible




150. Id. at 202 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stevens.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 201.
153. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
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error by refusing the defendant's request to question prospective jurors
specifically on the issue of racial prejudice.' 54 The majority held that a
capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have pro-
spective jurors informed of the victim's race and questioned on the issue
of racial bias.1
55
However, five of the justices (four justices joined by Chief Justice
Burger concurring in the judgment) concluded that there was no need to
reverse the conviction, reasoning that "an unacceptable risk" of racial
prejudice had existed only during the capital sentence proceeding.'
56
The plurality based its distinction on "a unique opportunity for racial
prejudice to operate but remain undetected" during a capital sentencing
proceeding and the "qualitative difference of death from all other punish-
ments requir[ing] a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the cap-
ital sentencing determination."' 157 The plurality bolstered its reasoning
by stating that the determination of guilt was governed by Ristaino: "the
mere fact that petitioner is black and his victim white does not constitute
a 'special circumstance' of constitutional proportions."' 158 Thus the plu-
rality deferred to the discretion of state trial courts in the conduct of voir
dire.
Both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concurred in vacating
the death sentence and dissented from upholding the conviction. 159 They
maintained that a defendant has a constitutional right to have a trial
judge ask the members of the venire questions concerning possible racial
bias whenever a violent interracial crime has been committed. 60 Both
Justices Brennan and Marshall asserted the Aldridge rule that the risk of
racial prejudice tainting a jury's decision outweighs the cost of allowing a
defendant to choose to inquire into prospective juror racial bias.'
6'
After observing that "[t]he reality of race relations in this country is
such that we simply may not presume impartiality,"'' 62 Justice Brennan
drew on the Court's earlier statements in Ham and Rosales-Lopez to
make the point that the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury ne-
154. Id. at 36-37.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 37.
157. Id. at 35 (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)).
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id. at 38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 45 (Marshall, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Id. at 39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 45 (Marshall, J..
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
161. Id. at 39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 45 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Id. at 39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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cessitates taking reasonable steps to so insure, 63 as well as the corollary
that deficient voir dire impairs the defendant's right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges. 64 Justice Marshall referred to the reasoning he had em-
ployed in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Ross v. Massachusetts,
thus indicating his continued frustration with what he saw as the Court's
repeated failure to fulfill the promise of constitutional protection in crim-
inal proceedings offered in Aldridge and Ham.
65
III. BATSON AND TURNER: VIEWED TOGETHER, WHAT MESSAGE
HAS THE SUPREME COURT SENT?
More than a decade before Batson and Turner, Justice Mosk of the
California Supreme Court was convinced that lack of attorney involve-
ment in voir dire would "severely handicap counsel in exercising peremp-
tory challenges."' 16 6 In his dissent from People v. Crowe,' 67 Justice Mosk
addressed the issue head on: "If counsel is not permitted to rely on his
impressions of the veniremen gained from personal interrogation, he will
be compelled in exercising peremptory challenges to fall back on his own
latent prejudices and biases."'' 68 Thus, lack of effective voir dire encour-
ages biased exercise of peremptory challenges. Justice Mosk also at-
tacked the notion that a judge's conduct of the questioning elicits a
reliably candidjuror response: "No well-intentioned but necessarily gen-
eral inquiry by the court-such as, 'Will you be prejudiced against the
defendant because of his race or color?'-is likely to produce anything
but a negative response."'
' 69
It is precisely the risk of prosecutorial discrimination that inheres to
voir dire exclusively conducted by a judge that is the basis of the dis-
turbing inconsistency between Batson and Turner. Turner's upholding of
the conviction despite a voir dire devoid of specific questioning on racial
prejudice does not square with Batson's easing of the defendant's eviden-
tiary burden regarding discriminatory peremptory challenges. In Turner
163. Id. at 40 (citing Ham, 409 U.S. at 532).
164. Id. (citing Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 188).
165. Id. at 45 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).




169. Id. Moreover, as at least one commentator has noted, even the one question concerning
racial prejudice that Turner held necessary is most likely inadequate in determining prospective
juror prejudice. See Alschuler, supra note 32, at 160 (the Turner procedure for determining juror
bias is minimally useful in that -[o]ne doubts that Lester Maddox, Orville Faubus, George Wallace,
Theodore Bilbo or anyone else would have responded to the proposed question by confessing a bias
likely to affect his or her resolution of a capital murder case.").
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the Court exhibited a willingness to subordinate and limit its Batson-level
concern regarding the risk of racial prejudice infecting a criminal trial to
a concern about racially biased capital sentencing.
It is Batson's and Turner's consistency in deferring to trial judges
which explains why it is difficult to square the two cases with equal pro-
tection principles. The Court's desire to leave much to the discretion of
the trial judge has resulted in the Turner holding tacitly allowing limited,
judge-conducted voir dire which in many cases in the federal and state
systems renders Batson's equal protection statement a hollow promise.
Batson enhanced a black criminal defendant's opportunity to prevent dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges. However, in an effort not to intrude
on a trial judge's conduct of jury selection proceedings, Batson failed to
establish key procedural safeguards. Batson seems premised on active
attorney participation in the voir dire. This assumption seems logically
consistent with the holding because a probing voir dire facilitates an in-
formed peremptory challenge, indeed it acts as a check on the biased
assumptions Batson prohibited.
1 70
Batson suggested that a trial judge may, among other things, look at
the type of questions a prosecutor asked, or did not ask, on voir dire to
determine whether "relevant circumstances" raise an inference of pur-
posefully discriminatory peremptory challenges.' 7' Indeed, in his con-
curring opinion, Justice White seems to confirm that attorney
involvement in voir dire is the Court's premise. He describes the prose-
cutor as having had a chance to voir dire the prospective jurors "in most
cases." 172
However, Batson's assumption of active attorney participation in
voir dire is unwarranted, based both on the facts of Batson's trial and on
courtroom practice in most federal and many state courts today. Trial
judge discretion has virtually foreclosed the opportunity for attorney in-
volvement in voir dire in many trials.173 In Batson's trial, as well as in
Turner's, the judge, not the attorneys, conducted voir dire. 174 Conse-
quently, one of the means the Batson Court pointed to as a possible indi-
cator of prosecutorial intent-prosecutor interaction with the venire-
simply does not exist in a great many trials.
The practical result is that the defendant raising a Batson challenge
often may not have available to him the evidence of prosecutorial dis-
170. See Serr & Maney, supra note 74, at 53.
171. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
172. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring).
173. See supra note 79.
174. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82-83 & n.2; Turner, 476 U.S. at 30-31.
[Vol. 65:273
LIMITED VOIR DIRE
criminatory intent that would satisfy the prima facie showing require-
ment. This is particularly likely in the less than blatant instances of
discrimination, for example, in those instances where the prosecutor has
.peremptorily challenged only a couple-not all-of the minority
veniremembers. In these less than blatant cases, the defendant's lighter
evidentiary burden-making a prima facie case based on the facts of his
trial alone-is rendered meaningless. Put another way, Batson's equal
protection statement, absent attorney conducted voir dire, presents the
establishment of a right for which there may effectively be no remedy. ' 75
Ironically, in a case denying the retroactive application of Batson,
the Supreme Court pointed to voir dire as an important alternative
source of protection of the defendant's right to an impartial trial. In
Allen v. Hardy,t 7 6 the Court explained that failure to apply Batson retro-
actively would not create fundamental unfairness to the defendant be-
cause a careful voir dire creates a "high probability that the individual
jurors seated in a particular case were free from bias."'' 77 Indeed, in re-
viewing Batson challenges, appellate courts frequently consider-as
much as is possible from the available record-the probative quality of
the voir dire in evaluating whether discrimination tainted jury selection.
For example, in Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 78 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, citing Allen v. Hardy, characterized a
careful voir dire as a companion protection-along with the Batson
rule-of a defendant's right to a neutral factfinder. 79
But, as the Supreme Court has very recently acknowledged, signifi-
cant limitations inhere to review of voir dire. In Gomez v. United
States,t' ° the Court overturned a felony conviction on the ground that a
175. Rickie Pearson, the black attorney who (ironically enough) represented Kentucky before
the Supreme Court in Batson, has questioned how a prosecutor or defense counsel can build a
record supporting or refuting a claim of discrimination if the trial court conducts voir dire itself.
Stewart, Supreme Court Report, 72 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (July 1, 1986). Pearson has asserted that, as a
practical matter, in order to comply with the Batson mandate, prosecutors have to conduct voir dire
on each juror in order to build a record supporting any subsequent peremptory strike. Id. at 70.
For a brief discussion of the likelihood that Batson has, ironically, provided prosecutors with
one or two "free shot" opportunities to discriminate without having to explain the challenges, see
Alschuler, supra note 32, at 172-73.
For a related discussion of "rights without remedies" in the equal protection context, see Rice,
The Discriminatory Purpose Standard. A Problem For Minorities In Racial Discrimination Litiga-
tion?, 6 B.C. THIRD WORL D L.J. 1 (1986).
176. 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
177. Id. at 259. In fact, the Court said that the Batson rule has joined voir dire as a procedure
that protects a defendant's interest in a neutral factfinder.
178. 806 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1986).
179. Id. at 76-77. Interestingly, this case concerned the opposite of the typical Batson scenario.
The victim of the rape was a black and the defendant was white. The prosecutor had peremptorily
challenged whites.
180. 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989).
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federal magistrate's presiding over jury selection had constituted revers-
ible error. In explaining why a district court's review of the magistrate's
conduct of voir dire would be inadequate, Justice Stevens, writing for a
unanimous court, said:
Far from an administrative impanelment process, voir dire repre-
sents jurors' first introduction to the substantive factual and legal is-
sues in a case. To detect prejudices, the examiner-often, in the
federal system, the court-must elicit from prospective jurors candid
answers about intimate details of their lives. The court further must
scrutinize not only spoken words but also gestures and attitudes of all
participants to ensure the jury's impartiality. But only words can be
preserved for review; no transcript can recapture the atmosphere of the
voir dire, which may persist throughout the trial.'1
8
Further, the Court's confidence, as expressed in Batson, that the
trial judge's expertise in supervising voir dire will enable the judge to
determine if the "relevant circumstances" contribute to the creation of a
prima facie case of discrimination 8 2 seems unfounded. A number of
studies indicate that a judge is not nearly as likely as an attorney to un-
cover prospective juror bias during voir dire.'8 3 Largely this is because
of a judge's relatively greater status as an intimidating authority figure; 1
84
his or her propensity for asking collective and close-ended (rather than
individual and elicitory) questions of the jurors; 85 and his or her consid-
erably lesser familiarity (as compared to trial counsel) with the various
factual nuances of the case. I8 6 If the judge conducts the questioning in a
way that does not elicit candid, revealing juror responses, there is only a
remote chance of "relevant circumstances" emerging during voir dire
181. Id. at 2247 (citations omitted).
182. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
183. Judges are perceived as having more status, and are thus more intimidating to jurors, than
lawyers. Hearing, supra note 79, at 55 (statement of The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Chief
Judge, U.S. Dist. Court, M.D. Tenn.); Suggs & Sales, supra note 68, at 253. An empirical investiga-
tion indicated that judges are perceived as holding extremely conservative positions, whereas attor-
neys are perceived as holding rather liberal opinions. It has been infzrred from this finding, as well as
from other data (such as experimental prospective jurors changing their answers almost twice as
frequently when questioned by a judge as when interviewed by an attorney) that jurors tend to say
what they believe a judge wants to hear, rather than what they truly think about an issue. Jones,
Judge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, I I L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 131, 143 (1987). See also J. GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 52 (1988).
184. J. GUINTHER, supra note 183.
185. One commentator suggests that the general and close-ended nature of judge-conducted voir
dire questions may stem in part from the fact that the questions are directed at uncovering reasons to
challenge for cause and are set by court rule or by statute and are worded to cover all cases. Note.
Voir Dire: Establishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493, 1505 (1975). Additionally, the requirement in many jurisdictions that a pro-
spective juror openly and explicitly admit to prejudice before being excluded for cause (a highly
unlikely public display) tends to keep judges' questions general and close-ended. Id. at 1506.
186. Hearing, supra note 79, at 52 (statement of Judge Wiseman).
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from which the prosecutor's discriminatory intent in making peremptory
challenges can be inferred in those less than blatant instances mentioned
above.
Thus, because of the lack of attorney involvement in questioning
and the relatively slim possibility that a judge conducting voir dire will
elicit candid, and hence probative, responses, the Batson Court's confi-
dence in the trial judge's ability to discern prosecutorial discrimination
seems unwarranted. Credence is thus lent-though perhaps not for the
reason he intended-to Justice Marshall's observation that "trial courts
are ill-equipped to second-guess those reasons given by the prosecutor for
his peremptory challenges."'18 7 Justice Marshall's concern was that a
trial judge could not discern the motives of a prosecutor who is exercis-
ing challenges. But actually the more disturbing prospect emanating
from exclusively judge-conducted voir dire is the judge's diminished abil-
ity to evaluate the prosecutor's challenges within a context of the prose-
cutor's interaction with the veniremembers. Further, the prosecutor's
"seat-of-the-pants instincts,"' 88 which Justice Marshall described as
often being "just another term for racial prejudice,"' 89 are much more
likely to become the basis for peremptory challenges when the voir dire
has not afforded the prosecutor a meaningful-or any-opportunity to
question jurors. As a result, voir dire questioning conducted exclusively
by the judge could increase, rather than reduce, the risk of the prosecu-
tor's peremptory challenges being based on superficial and possibly in-
correct assumptions.
The limitations of judge-conducted voir dire in the federal court sys-
tem were acknowledged in a post-Batson case, United States v. Biaggi. 190
Although the defendants were found to have made a prima facie case of
prosecutorial discrimination against Italian-Americans, the court denied
the defendants' motion to set aside their convictions, finding the
187. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
188. Id. (quoting id. at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
189. Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
190. 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312
(1989). The case, interestifigly, was also one of the first to consider whether the Batson holding was
applicable to groups other than blacks.
Further, a year later, in the related case of United States v. Biaggi, No. SSSS 87 Cr. 255
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file), the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether the prosecution had exercised peremptory challenges in a discrimina-
tory fashion. The court referred to the "large assortment of handwritten lists and notes" as well as
the "hours of cross-examination which [the prosecutor] endured" to explain the challenges made.
seemingly bearing out Justice Mosk's prediction that the time "saved" by an abbreviated, cursory




prosecutorial explanations to have provided a satisfactory rebuttal. 9 1
But the Biaggi court strongly suggested that it might be applying a differ-
ent (i.e., lower) standard in the scrutiny of a prosecutor's rebuttal when
the prosecutor had not had an opportunity to participate in voir dire.
"These [peremptory] strikes must all be seen in the context of a federal
voir dire. The attorneys do not generally ask the questions. . . .They
therefore are forced to rely more on inference and assumptions than
would counsel with full data on the venire."' 192 The Biaggi court thus
seemed to indicate that, when a prosecutor has not been provided the
opportunity to check (possibly biased) assumptions against prospective
juror responses, the court must give the prosecutor the benefit of the
doubt when evaluating whether there was discriminatory intent.
Moreover, in United States v. Sangineto-Miranda,93 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently suggested that the degree and type
of attorney involvement in voir dire may have a bearing on the appellate
court's consideration of a defendant's claim of discriminatory challenges
by the prosecutor. "In the instant case, the district court conducted voir
dire and incorporated questions submitted in advance by both the prose-
cution and counsel for the defendants. Thus, there was no occasion for
'questions and statements during voir dire examination,' as contemplated
by Batson."'1 94 The court rejected the defendant's Batson challenge, con-
cluding that the defendant had not presented sufficient indications of
prosecutorial discrimination.
The Supreme Court's refusal in Turner to reverse the defendant's
conviction has disturbing implications regarding the Court's commit-
ment to ensuring that Batson's mandate will be fully realized. It might
be argued that the two cases can be reconciled on the ground that Turner
involved the limitation of a prophylactic procedural rule (i.e., voir
dire), 195 while Batson involved the affirmation of a constitutional guaran-
tee (i.e., equal protection). However, this argument does not withstand
thoughtful analysis. A defendant's rights to a fair trial by an impartial
jury and to equal protection under the law are abrogated as much by a
judge's superficial examination of the venire as by a prosecutor's biased
191. The prosecutor explained that he had peremptorily challenged the veniremembers because
of demeanor (e.g., anger), inappropriately casual dress, and employment or organization affiliation
which might tend to arouse sympathy for the defendant, who had been similarly employed and
affiliated. 673 F. Supp. at 104-05.
192. Id. at 106.
193. 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988).
194. Id. at 1520 n.14.
195. In a footnote, the Turner plurality somewhat obliquely identified the basis for the bifurcated
holding as turning on the question of "'what prophylactic rules the Constitution imposes on the
States in furtherance of that right [to an impartial jury]." Turner, 476 U.S. at 38 n.12.
[Vol. 65:273
LIMITED VOIR DIRE
elimination from the venire of members of the defendant's race. Both
James Batson and Willie Lloyd Turner were left vulnerable to an unfair
trial because of jury selection procedures that did not adequately take
into account the possibility of bias among the jurors who tried them.
Whether termed a sixth amendment or a fourteenth amendment right,
both defendants argued that racial prejudice may have impermissibly
skewed the verdict. Whether the opportunity for a biased decision was
claimed to have resulted from cursory voir dire by the judge or discrimi-
natory challenges by the prosecutor, the resulting harm was the same
from the defendant's perspective.
IV. SYSTEMIC AND PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS MOTIVATING THE
COURT'S ESSENTIALLY IRRECONCILABLE STATEMENTS ON
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND VOIR DIRE
Two primary concerns likely motivate the Supreme Court's defer-
ence to trial judges which is apparent both in Batson and Turner: (1)
allocation of procedural power in a criminal trial and (2) institutional
administrative pressures. These concerns have surfaced in the course of
legislative hearings regarding proposed amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil and Criminal Procedure that govern the conduct of voir dire.
Senate bills to allow voir dire examination by counsel for each side were
introduced in 1981,196 1983,197 1987,198 and again in early 1989.199 The
impetus for these bills has been concern regarding the ramifications on
the fair administration of justice when a judge exclusively conducts voir
dire in an abbreviated and cursory manner. 2°° The first three legislative
attempts died in committee after lengthy testimony from impassioned
spokespersons on both sides. 20'
196. Hearing on S. 1532 Before the Subcomm. ol Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
197. In early 1983, during the first session of the 98th Congress, Senator Heflin introduced bills
amending the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure governing voir dire to allow thirty
minutes of examination by counsel. Hearings were conducted the following year. See Hearing on S.
386 and S. 677 Before the Subconn. on Courts of the Senate Comm. ol the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984).
198. During the first session of the 100th Congress Senator Heflin again introduced bills amend-
ing the federal rules to allow thirty minutes of voir dire. See Hearing, supra note 79.
199. Senator Heflin yet again introduced bills amending federal court voir dire practice in March
1989. S. 591 and S. 592, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S2571 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1989).
200. See Hearing, supra note 79.
201. Besides the tension between judges and trial lawyers on the conduct and scope of voir dire,
there is tension between the judiciary and the legislature. One commentator, characterizing jury
selection as "one of those areas in the twilight between substance and procedure where courts and
legislatures often share responsibility for legislative reforms," notes that the Supreme Court has seen
many of its proposed rule changes delayed or significantly modified by Congress. Pizzi. supra note
64, at 150. This cuts both ways, however. Legislative attempts to mandate attorney participation in
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Those who oppose any modification in the rules argue that voir dire
is exclusively a method of securing an impartial jury, as opposed to se-
lecting a jury.20 2 Thus, the proponents of judge-conducted voir dire ar-
gue that a zealous advocate's predilection to "shape" the jury in order to
extract a favorable verdict is a major justification for the judge retaining
control over the examination process.
20 3
Further, supporters of judge-conducted voir dire frequently cite dra-
matic contrasts between the length of time involved in judge-conducted
voir dire in the federal courts and that involved in states such as New
York and California, which have allowed attorney-conducted voir dire
(where it has occasionally taken days) to make the point that attorney
involvement will lead to abuses of the judicial system. 2°4 Consequently,
judges cognizant both of an advocate's proclivity to select a jury
favorable to his side and of the comparative sluggishness of the American
criminal trial process20 5 view tight control of the voir dire as a necessary
means to the achievement of fair administration of justice.
There is a pronounced administrative concern in the courts today
regarding efficient time and caseload management. Recent statistics
show that the combined civil and criminal caseload for federal judges
rose 133% since 1970 but the number of judges rose only forty-three
percent.20 6 Some commentators have suggested that administrative and
institutional pressures to keep their calendars moving-intensified by the
proliferation of litigation since the 1960s and the greatly increased
caseload in federal district courts-encourages judges to maintain exclu-
sive control over voir dire.20 7  One commentator posited that a judge
voir dire have been ardently fought by judges, partially explaining the lack of success of these bills.
See generally the testimony of judges in the legislative hearings for the Senate bills cited supra notes
197 and 198.
202. [The lawyer's] questions demonstrate the wisdom of committing to the trial judge the
primary responsibility of qualifying and conditioning the jurors to sit in judgment on their
fellowmen and the folly of leaving voir dire to the rhetorical vagaries of trial counsel. It
must be remembered that the purpose of voir dire is to enable the parties to obtain an
impartial jury, not to select jurors.
G. BERMANT, SUpra note 79, at 21 (quoting United States v. Williams, 417 F.2d 630, 631 (10th Cir.
1969)).
203. See G. BERMANT, supra note 79.
204. See Hearing on S. 386 and S. 677. supra note 197, at 265-71 (statement of Stephen S. Trott.
Associate Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
205. The American trial process is one of the most complicated, expensive and time-consuming
in the world-more so, in fact, than that of any European system. Pizzi, supra note 64, at 138-39.
206. Hearing, supra note 79, at 7-8 (statement of Joe D. Whitley, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General. Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice).
207. Id. at 19 (letter of John R. Bolton, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs. U.S. Dept. of Justice).
Indeed. only on June 12, 1989 did the Supreme Court state that it is improper for federal
magistrates to preside over jury selection in a felony trial. In Gomez v. United States. 109 S. Ct. 2237
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may view each hour he uses conducting voir dire as an hour that will not
be spent trying another case.208 Thus, in these litigious times, a judge
mindful of his or her heavy docket and the costs attendant on lengthy
voir dire will bring an awareness of the "running meter" to his or her
consideration of what is an acceptably thorough voir dire.
However, proponents of attorney involvement in voir dire point out
that the dramatic contrasts cited in length of voir dire can be deceptive.
Ninety-three percent of all voir dire in federal criminal cases has been
estimated to take less than two hours and sixty-five percent of the cases
less than than one hour, with an average time of fifty minutes.20 9 A
study has shown that voir dire was on the average only one minute
longer with lawyer participation in criminal cases than when the judge
conducted the questioning. 210 Moreover, a judge's ultimate supervisory
control over the voir dire process can stem inappropriately long-winded
questions and abusive tactics by an attorney during voir dire as in any
other part of the trial process. 21' In his People v. Crowe dissent, Justice
Mosk found myopic and misguided the time and efficiency concerns on
which the exclusion of attorneys from the voir dire is often based. "[I]f
the court alone interrogates veniremen, taking some questions suggested
by counsel and .. . imperiously rejecting others, an issue for appellate
review emerges ... [a] substantial portion of the time saved at trial may
thus be expended on appeal.
'2 12
The proponents of attorney involvement in voir dire have the more
realistic, as well as more faithfully constitutional view. In enforcing the
equal protection requirement in other areas, such as school desegregation
and affirmative action hiring programs, even more significant administra-
tive and societal costs have been assumed, justified by the imperative of
affording citizens their constitutional guarantees. And, as one commen-
(1989), the Court stated that magistrates' presiding over jury selection was limited to civil and minor
criminal trials. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
208. See J. GUINrHER, supra note 183. See also Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Con-
ducted to Ensure that Our Juries Are Representative and Inpartial?. 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65, 76
(1976). See generally Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search Jbr Appropriate Remedies, 68 Iow,A L. REV. 871
(1983) and Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts. The Tension Between Justice and Effi-
ciency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 648 (1980) for a discussion of how the crisis of overload in the
federal courts threatens the integrity of the courts and the quality of justice.
209. G. BERMANT, supra note 79, at 13 & n.18.
210. Id. at 14 n.20.
211. See supra note 115.
212. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d at 840, 506 P.2d at 210-11, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (Mosk, J.. dissenting).
Justice Mosk is not alone in his belief that time saved initially in abbreviated, superficial voir dire




tator points out, the time and costs that potentially inhere to a reforma-
tion of jury selection practices are considerably less-as well as more
likely to succeed-than in other areas that have reformed to comply with
the equal protection mandate. 213 Certainly in the criminal setting, where
liberty, indeed sometimes life, see Turner, hangs in the balance, it would
seem that the costs attendant on more thorough voir dire are justifiable.
V. THE NEED FOR THE SUPREME COURT To STATE CLEARLY THE
PROPER POST-BATSON ROLE OF VOIR DIRE
The Court's decisions in Ristaino, Rosales-Lopez, and Turner have
demonstrated a shrinking of the Aldridge and Ham rule that has troub-
ling ramifications on a minority defendant's constitutional rights at trial.
These ramifications are especially disturbing in a social climate where
racial and ethnic prejudice is not only pervasive, but indeed seems to be
growing. 214  News reports on bigotry on college campuses and the
growth of extremist youth groups such as the Skinheads, as well as the
Howard Beach incident give alarming, illustrative force to Justices Mar-
shall's and Brennan's argument that the prevalence of racism in late
twentieth century America necessarily precludes a limited voir dire pre-
mised on a presumption of juror impartiality.
In a thoughtful analysis of Batson, the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland 21 5 suggested that perhaps the Supreme Court issued a deliber-
ately ambiguous opinion because of the problematic nature of racial or
ethnic discrimination in jury selection-a grave social problem, the solu-
tion to which involves "a course of action [that] is at once logically un-
tenable but sociologically imperative .... The Court may then 'buy time'
by denying certiorari."'2t 6 The Court has been known to deny certiorari
for the express purpose of allowing the state courts to act as "laborato-
ries."1217 When, as in the case of voir dire and peremptory challenges,
constitutional issues in the criminal justice system are hanging in the bal-
ance, the potential cost of this approach seems impermissibly steep.
213. Kuhn, supra note 68, at 328.
214. A number of commentators have recently observed that racism is by no means on the
wane-that, indeed, there are troubling indications of its tenacity. See, e.g., Irwin, Race and the Law:
Blacks Growing More Skeptical of Courts in Racial Bias Cases, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 28.
1987, at 3. California State Assembly Speaker Willie Brown recently was quoted as observing that
"Nothing has changed radically in this country since Martin [Luther King Jr.] died in April of
1968." Boston Globe, Jan. 17, 1989, at 10.
215. Chew v. State, 71 Md. App. 681, 527 A.2d 332 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987).
216. Id. at 717. 527 A.2d at 350.
217. McCray v. New York, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) ("[lIt is a sound exercise of
discretion for the Court to allow the various States to serve as laboratories in which the issue receives
further study before it is addressed by this Court").
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LIMITED VOIR DIRE
Batson is now more than three years old and the trend continues to
move toward judges exclusively conducting voir dire. Rather than leav-
ing so much regarding the scope of voir dire to judicial discretion, the
Supreme Court should unambiguously state not only the broad constitu-
tional principles underlying voir dire, but how these principles are to be
implemented. Despite the Court's understandable desire to afford trial
judges sufficient latitude to respond flexibly to diverse trial situations, the
current high standard of deference to judicial conduct of voir dire clearly
prevents the full realization of Batson's equal protection mandate.
The history of both the enactment of the fourteenth amendment and
the host of subsequent civil rights statutes and cases largely has been the
history of action having been taken at the highest levels of the national
government because of inadequate responsiveness at other levels.2 18 So,
in that respect, the need for a definitive Supreme Court statement on the
contours of voir dire that is coextensive with the Batson mandate is con-
sistent with the history of so much of civil rights law.
The justification for the Court modifying its usual posture of defer-
ence to trial judges is that criminal trials are constitutionally premised on
the notion that both society, as represented by the prosecutor, and the
defendant have an opportunity to have justice administered. An integral
part of this opportunity is the jury selection process by which the parties
satisfy themselves that the case will be tried to adequate finders of fact. 2 19
Community confidence in the legal system thus requires the Court's ex-
plicit recognition that a thorough examination of prospective jurors is as
necessary an incident to a fair trial as is the Batson statement. In the
hierarchy of judicial concerns, as Chief Justice John Marshall pointed
218. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 393-94 (5th ed. 1988) (it was the
judicial branch, with the Supreme Court at its apex, which led the other branches of government in
tackling problems of racial injustice in this country, beginning in the late 1940s); OAKES, The Proper
Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, in THE EvoL-VING CONSTIT-UTION 169,
191 (N. Dorsen ed. 1987) (Brown v. Board of Education teaches that creative methods of remedying
rights deprivation is essential to ensure these rights do not become empty promises. "This shoe of
judicial activism may pinch many feet, but the other shoe of inaction has already pinched far too
many.").
219. At least one commentator has criticized Turner as manifesting a systemic pattern of conde-
scension toward jurors in that merely a single voir dire question on racial prejudice is deemed neces-
sary in the capital trial of a minority defendant, while jurors are restricted in so many other ways
from actively participating in the goings-on at trial, e.g., not permitted to ask questions, take notes.
hear sidebar conferences. See Alschuler, supra note 32, at 161. While there is indeed much to this
claim of systemic inconsistency vis-a-vis the jury's role, concern about patronizing and insulting
prospective jurors by questioning them on racial prejudice seems unwarranted given the far greater
risk of trying a minority defendant before a panel of jurors whose ability to decide guilt or innocence
is tainted by prejudicial notions carried into the courtroom. Jurors probably should be given more of
an opportunity to participate or at least observe various aspects of the trial process. But denying the
defendant the right to have prospective jurors thoroughly questioned because, after all. jurors are
kept from so much else at trial, is not a constitutionally permissible alternative.
1989] 305
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out in Marbury v. Madison,220 constitutional demands such as these su-
persede administrative and institutional concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
Batson v. Kentucky and Turner v. Murray, viewed in juxtaposition,
reflect a deeply troubling inconsistency in the Supreme Court's approach
to criminal trial procedural protection for minority defendants. On the
one hand, Batson eased the minority defendant's burden in making a
prima facie showing of discrimination by the prosecutor in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. On the other hand, Turner, decided on the same
day as Batson, upheld a conviction despite a voir dire that excluded ques-
tions about racial prejudice in the criminal trial of a black defendant.
The two holdings are essentially irreconcilable because a probative voir
dire is an essential predicate to the intelligent exercise of peremptory
challenges. Thus, without an inquiry into possible racial prejudice
among the prospective jurors, a minority defendant's lighter burden in
claiming discriminatory challenges is effectively diminished to a signifi-
cant degree. The Supreme Court should address this inconsistency by
issuing an opinion in the near future which acknowledges the essential
linkage of a thorough voir dire to the non-discriminatory exercise of per-
emptory challenges.
220. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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